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 In 2013, China revealed its plan to increase connectivity along historical trade routes in 
parts of Europe, Asia, and the African continent with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The 
European Union (EU) is concerned with the effects that this initiative will have on the global 
status of the EU as well as on the relationships between the EU and China. I will explore how 
EU policy has changed recently due to the increase in global influence that China has seen 
through the initiative and whether or not China is successfully dividing the European Union 
through this initiative.  
 The European Union is often described as a normative world power, that is, the EU acts 
in pursuit of its ideals rather than in a material or physical pursuit. My hypothesis is that the EU 
is straying from its normative power narrative and undertaking a more realist perspective in order 
to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. I will analyze the shifts in policy and rhetoric 
of the EU and the EU-China relationship as concerned with the timeline of the BRI through the 
official public relations outlets of the EU. This will be conducted through a frame analysis of the 
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China’s geopolitical success through its Belt and Road Initiative has forced the European 
Union to take notice and respond in order to maintain its status as a geopolitical power and 
reassert its own influence on EU member states and abroad. The BRI is China’s major project 
aimed at investment in developing economies in order to increase trade between China and the 
project host countries. The idea is to create increased connectivity, as the Silk Road did during its 
time, with a particular focus on Eurasia and Africa but permeating into the European continent as 
well. Due to the spreading Chinese influence, the EU must adjust its proclaimed value-driven 
policies to remain a competitive actor on the global stage. Although often described as a 
normative power, as Ian Manners1 argued, the European Union responds to the BRI in ways that 
show it is instead a realist power that can impose its normative narrative when it is in its best 
interest to do so. This thesis will consider the policy implementations and language use in the 
press releases of the European Union that relate to its endeavor to counter Chinese influence to 
determine the power narrative of the EU. The concern of European Union unity plays a role in its 
response to China and thus, this thesis will also analyze China’s role in dividing the EU and how 
and if the EU responds as a single actor.  
Understanding the narrative of the European Union is undoubtedly difficult because it is 
often challenging to comprehend the entity of the EU, however, it is essential in order to 
understand how the European Commission constructs the foreign policy frame of the European 
Union. The EU is not a state as most international relation theories would prefer it to be in order 
 
1 Manners, Ian. 2002. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 
40 (2): 235-258. 
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to analyze it. It is instead a unit of many states but acts as one body. There is difficulty with 
defining the European Union with a single, unifying idea because the EU is composed of many 
different actors. Not only is it a governing system that is comprised of 27 different sovereign 
states, which can often present its own challenges in creating a single voice, the structure of the 
EU is broken down into the Commission, Council, and Parliament (at a basic level).  
The EU has the aim to ‘speak with one voice’ but is often criticized for not doing so. 
Undeniably, that is not easy to do because of the multilevel nature of the European Union. 
Carmen Gebhard, who evaluated the coherence of EU policy in international relations, 
effectively summarized the breakdown of EU external relations:  
EU external relations have traditionally been divided into two different procedural 
channels of decision-making, financing, and implementation: a supranational one 
primarily governed by the European Commission that comprises external trade, 
development cooperation, humanitarian aid and prevention, and an intergovernmental 
one governed by the Council and the member states that comprises the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the 
EU.2 
Gebhard’s observation provides an introduction to the complex nature of the organization of the 
EU. It is hard to evaluate where to begin analyzing the European Union when there are so many 
different actors within the organization. Gebhard goes on to discuss the coherence of the EU and 
defines the term in the context of the EU as “the ambition and necessity to bring together 
different strands of the EU’s external relations, both strategically and procedurally.”3  
 
2 Gebhard, Carmen. 2017. "The Problem of Coherence in the European Union's International Relations." In 
International Relations and the European Union (3rd edition), by Michael Smith, Sophie Vanhoonacker 
Christopher Hill, p. 124. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 




Through the different guiding treaties of the EU, the coherence problem has been 
addressed and presented with possible solutions through the distribution of power to different EU 
bodies but still maintaining unity. The current legal framework for the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon, 
defined the coherence strategy of the EU today. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) was established as well as assigning a new role for the High 
Representative (HR) in the EU’s external relations which was in the aims to help balance the 
power between the Commission and the Council in these affairs.4 However, while the EU has 
made steps towards bettering the coherence within the EU system, there are many problems of 
coherence between the EU’s message and the messages of the member states that make up the 
EU. Political differences of member states make coherence very improbable, but the EU external 
action community has still prevailed at delivering ‘operational solutions’ despite the challenges.5 
These differences in message will contribute to the frame the Commission constructs for the EU 
and make it increasingly difficult to judge the relationship between the EU and China. The 
question of whether China is dividing the European Union may have merit, but it may also just 
showcase a preexisting problem in EU structure.  
The EU has itself addressed the need for greater unity in response to global power shifts 
in its EU Global Strategy released in 2016.6 Lisbeth Aggestam and Markus Johansson examine 
the leadership paradox that exists in EU Foreign Policy in their article published in 2017. The 
 
4 Gebhard, Carmen. 2017. "The Problem of Coherence in the European Union's International Relations." In 
International Relations and the European Union (3rd edition), by Michael Smith, Sophie Vanhoonacker Christopher 
Hill, p. 138. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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6 European Union. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European 





idea of dispersed leadership within the EU stems from its pursuit to avoid the common European 
history that allowed for too powerful leadership from one source. Thus, responsibilities and 
power are distributed in the EU institutions. However, the area of foreign policy is associated at 
the national level and the EU must accommodate for the ‘intergovernmental instincts and social 
practices derived from its Member States.’7 Aggestam and Johansson find that EU member states 
and the EU itself have competing ideas on the expected leadership role of the EU in foreign 
policy, especially in times when the normative power leadership is fading.8 These competing 
ideas can lead to greater division within the EU foreign policy frame, which may be exacerbated 
by China, intentionally or unintentionally, but to China’s benefit nonetheless.  
There are two questions that will drive the research and argument of this thesis. The first 
is focused on defining the narrative of the European Union. Is China’s geopolitical success and 
spread of influence through the Belt and Road Initiative pushing the EU to diverge from its 
normative power narrative? Does the widespread argument of EU normative power still stand if 
the EU is veering from this narrative? A better definition of the EU power narrative may be that 
it is, as most common international actors are, a realist power, but chooses to define itself as a 
normative power that is value-driven when it is beneficial and diverges from this classification 
when its geopolitical status is at risk. This question will be answered through an exploration of 
the EU’s frame for its external relations as constructed by the policy and rhetoric of the European 
Commission. A frame analysis, as developed by Erving Goffman9, will be conducted in order to 
 
7 Aggestam, Lisbeth and Markus Johansson. 2017. "The leadership paradox in EU foreign policy." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 55 (6): 1203-1220. 
8 Ibid. 
 




determine if there has been a shift in narrative from the European Commission regarding its 
relations outside of Europe as a result of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In terms of policy, the 
Commission carefully selects its words and phrases to form a holistic picture regarding the EU’s 
narrative in relation to its foreign affairs. The normative understanding of the EU may classify 
the frame as ‘value-driven’ but this thesis will argue that in response to China’s BRI influence, 
the Commission would like to emphasis, that while the EU is still driven by its norms and values, 
it is also progressive and adaptable.  
The frame for EU foreign policy is set by the European Commission, often through press 
releases, bilateral agreements, and strategic plans. The bodies within the EU that drive the 
discussion of the EU’s external relations narrative are concentrated in the Commission and the 
European External Action Service. The EEAS works very closely with the Commission and the 
leading voice in the EEAS, the High Representative for foreign affairs and security policy, is 
also a Vice President of the Commission, making the information output between these two 
bodies virtually indivisible.  
The policy related documents published by the Commission from 2016 to 2020 will be 
analyzed to help understand the changes the EU is undertaking as it relates to the influence of the 
Belt and Road Initiative. The EEAS documents and press releases from the same time period, 
2016-2020, will also be considered when they are related to the key terms, ‘China’, ‘Asia’, ‘Belt 
and Road’, ‘Investment’, and ‘Aid’ to better understand the frame of the EU. These two bodies 
within the EU, mostly through the Commission, set the frame that the EU will be perceived as to 
the outside world.  
The frame analysis will be conducted on a short time period as the Belt and Road 
Initiative is still very recent, having only been announced in 2013. The three periods considered 
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for this analysis are prior to the announcement in 2013, between 2013 and 2016 when BRI 
projects were beginning, and between 2016 and 2020 where there has been enough progress to 
allow for analysis. The most important period for this analysis will be the third period as this is 
when the EU policy change will be most apparent. Although, it will be important to highlight the 
key changes and initial reactions to the announcement of the Initiative, the most efficient way to 
judge the effectiveness of the BRI at spreading Chinese influence will be through the later years 
response to it.  
The second research question is focused more on the notion that China is dividing the 
EU. The European Union’s inability to create a coherent response to Chinese investment creates 
problems for the member states. Each member state will instead act in its own self-interest, 
particularly in the interests of their respective economies. As member states are competing for 
China’s investment, China could be using this as a strategy to further increase its geopolitical 
power. A divided Europe is a weaker Europe and that may be to China’s advantage. Chinese 
representatives do claim their intention is not to divide Europe. Wang Chao, China’s vice-
minister of foreign affairs, has stated “China has no intention, nor do we have the ability, to 
divide Europe”10 and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang has said that China would “cooperate and 
respect European standards”11 in response to division concerns. The problem may lie on the EU 
side as its lack of communication, cohesion, and deficiency in creating a common policy to deal 
with China may be the cause of the divide.12 Thus, the question ‘Is China purposefully dividing 
 
10 Wong, Catherine. 2019. China will not divide Europe, senior diplomat says. April 3. 
 
11 Deutsche Welle. 2019. China promises not to divide EU at eastern Europe summit. December 4. 
 
12 Huotari, Mikko, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, John Seaman, and Alice Ekman. 2015. Mapping Europe-China Relations: 




the EU or is it the EU’s inability to form a united stance the cause of rifts between member states 
and the EU?’ This question will also be explored through EU policy and the rhetoric used by the 
Commission when discussing China and foreign investment. 
The following chapters will answer the research questions and provide a greater 
understanding of how the EU responds to the influence of the BRI. Chapter 1 will give a more 
in-depth introduction into the Belt and Road Initiative and the impact it has had on the global 
order. The relationship between Europe and China, both historically and presently, will be 
assessed in order to define the impact that the BRI might have on this relationship and to 
recognize why the BRI has the impact that it does. This chapter will also include a summary of 
the Center for a New American Security’s study on the Belt and Road Initiative. This study is 
important as it defines the greatest criticisms of the BRI projects in its host countries. This 
insight into potential problems for investment projects will drive the analysis of two case studies 
of BRI projects in Europe: China’s purchase of the Port of Piraeus in Greece and the major 
investment into a transnational railway between Hungary and Serbia. This first chapter sets up 
the understanding of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the impact it has had on the European 
Union in order to better grasp the analysis that will follow.  
The next chapter will delve further into the understanding of the EU narrative through the 
scholarly literature of Ian Manners with the concept of normative power Europe, Chad Damro’s 
market power Europe, and Adrian Hyde-Price’s realist critique of the EU narrative. These ideas 
have evolved as the EU has developed and help to show how scholars describe the EU and how 
the EU sees itself as an actor. Chapter 2 will also provide greater context into the concept of a 
frame analysis and how the method has developed to be used in different fields and for different 
actors. This method originated in the field of sociology by Erving Goffman but has developed 
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and been a key process in understanding actors in political science as well. This chapter 
illuminates how the EU foreign policy frame and narrative are interlinked and begins to explain 
why there is a shift in frame and narrative for the EU in response to the shifting global order.  
Chapter 3 will use these interpretations of the European Union’s narrative and frame 
analysis to analyze the changes in the EU through its policy and external relations. This chapter 
will utilize recent documents published by the Commission and the European External Action 
Service that construct the frame of the EU foreign policy to demonstrate the realist narrative of 
the EU. An analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative’s impact on the EU and the following 
changes in framing by the Commission. This chapter looks at the effects of the BRI on the EU’s 
internal relationships, on EU-China interactions, and on how the EU responds to the Initiative 
with other actors.  
The Conclusion will then summarize these findings and answer the research questions put 
forward that relate to defining the EU narrative and China’s attempt to divide the countries of the 
European Union. The impact of the BRI on the EU is made clear and the need for a greater 
response from the EU is necessary. The BRI is influencing the current global order and the 
European Union addresses this, but not to the extent it needs to. The Conclusion will also present 
ideas for furthering this research and potential different methods for doing so. It will also 
acknowledge how the current global events may be influencing the international order and what 




CHAPTER 1: THE BRI, CHINA, AND EUROPE 
 
The global influence China is successfully exerting through its Belt and Road Initiative is 
causing the European Union to take action. Originally called “One Belt, One Road” but 
rebranded due to the belief that the word ‘one’ could be causing misinterpretations, the BRI is 
China’s effort to channel past ideas of connectivity through trade routes like the Silk Road.13 
Although this is how the BRI is marketed, many believe that the ultimate goal is not focused on 
economic advances for China and partner countries, but on geopolitical gains for China. China is 
hoping that greater visibility of its investment in more countries will increase its influence in 
world affairs.  
China is investing in underdeveloped or struggling economies, mostly focused in the 
Eurasian and African regions, in infrastructure projects to increase trade within the host country. 
The projects that are being undertaken include investment in building bridges, improving train 
routes, expanding airports, and growing seaports. These projects are marketed as a win-win for 
both China and the host country as China is supposed to be able to readily do more trade in the 
country and the host country is able to grow its economy. The BRI stresses the principle of 
‘mutual benefit’ and aims to ensure that the interests and concerns of all parties involved are 
accommodated and the results of the projects lead to greater cooperation.14 In reality, the projects 
have not been displaying the equally advantageous outcomes that were expected, with one side 
of the table emerging much more satisfied than the other.  
 





The European Union is not oblivious to the changes in world power and the success that 
China is experiencing through the BRI. The EU becomes especially concerned when the projects 
hit so close to home, with BRI investment in parts of the Eastern neighborhood and within 
member states of the EU itself. The EU must respond to the Initiative in order to keep its own 
status as an international power and keep the EU a coherent entity. Changes are being made in 
EU policy and to the narrative of the EU to counteract Chinese influence, but the Union still 
needs to find its united stance.  
The European Union and China are no strangers to interaction. They have historical ties 
that link them back centuries. The positivity of the relationship fluctuated over time with 
European traders, including the infamous Marco Polo, exploring the Silk Road and exchanging 
goods and cultures and more recently to the colonial powers of Europe engaging in the Opium 
Wars. This rich history is important to the linkage of the two economies and both actors play 
large roles in the other’s economy to this day. Outside of trade, the two are connected 
diplomatically as China and the EU are both involved in many of the same international 
organizations. However, despite these connections and the two actors having participated in 
many bilateral trade talks, they have not developed a formal trade agreement, as is the goal for 
the EU with non-member states.15 The BRI is putting a fire underneath the EU to unite its stance 
on China but the EU’s and China’s vast difference in ideals is hindering an effective 
international partnership.  
 The projected completion timeline for the BRI is aimed at 2049, but there is a belief that 
the project is indefinite, especially in its ability to spread Chinese influence. As the project was 
 





only announced in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative is still considered very recent in terms of 
the ability for historical analysis. The effects of the BRI can be analyzed in three distinct periods: 
prior to 2013 and the declaration of the BRI, between 2013 and 2016 as the BRI was proposed 
and investment began, and 2016 to 2020 where projects are completed or have progressed 
enough to allow analysis. 
 The remainder of this chapter will further describe the timeline of the Belt and Road 
Initiative and the effect it has had on Europe. The section following this will explore the 
evolving relationship between China and Europe both as a united European Union and the 
bilateral relationships between China and individual EU member states. A study conducted by 
the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) will then be introduced in order to better 
understand some of the criticisms of BRI projects and how China may respond to them as well as 
what the EU may fear will happen with investment projects within its own borders. Following 
this, will be two case studies to measure the response of the EU when China conducts BRI 
projects in Greece and Hungary. The acquisition of the Port of Piraeus in Greece and the 
commitment to building a trans-national trainline between Budapest and Belgrade are both 
deeply concerning to the EU as it takes away its own influence in its member states and puts the 
member states at risk of some of the challenges presented in the CNAS study.  
 
Timeline of the BRI 
The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative was launched by president Xi Jinping in 2013. The 
aim of this project is to increase connectivity from China to other Asian countries, Eurasia all the 
way through to the African continent. The number of countries that are receiving investments 
12 
 
being made in efforts of this goal have been estimated at over one hundred, but there is no 
official count. Most of the investment of this project is in infrastructure and this can vary from 
railroads, highways, seaports, and even airports.16 
The Belt and Road Initiative will be considered through three different periods as it 
relates to EU policy change. Establishing this breakdown is important to understanding both the 
evolution of the normative power Europe as it is influenced by globalization and the change in 
frame set forth by the EU’s information outlets. The first period consists of the time prior to the 
announcement of the BRI in 2013 and the EU rhetoric in its media output before the Chinese 
announcement. This is the period before much of the criticism of the European Union’s narrative 
as a normative power entered EU policy discussion. China was a growing global power and the 
world was shifting its understanding of multipolarity. 
The second period consists of the years between the announcement of the BRI in 2013 to 
2016 when projects were at the beginning of implementation. This is a period where the EU is 
still in the decision-making process to determine how to respond to the BRI but still not fully 
committed to a response in the aim of still understanding the outcomes of the Initiative. Although 
an important period, the main focus of this analysis will be on new changes to EU policy and 
information output after this time. The most pertinent period is the period from 2016 to 2020, 
when the Belt and Road Initiative is mature enough to see results and analyze the effect it is 
having on the host countries and the world. This is when it is critical for the EU to respond and it 
begins to do so through policy changes. There is a global response to the BRI and a push for 
more international evaluation. Not only that, but the investment projects strike closer to home for 
 




Europe with BRI projects happening most notably in Greece and Hungary, as well as in the 
larger European neighborhood. This calls for more EU project assessment and response.  
 
Relationship Between China and the European Union 
 The European Union and China have dramatically increased their interactions within the 
past 20 years. The EU and China created formal ties in 1975 although China’s history with 
European countries date back much further.17 The EU and China relationship was not always a 
high priority, especially after the Cold War when there was an increased focus on the 
relationship with the United States. However, as the global powers shifted and multipolarity 
grew, China quickly headed for developed country status. It made sure to create important 
connections with Europe, the historical powerhouse of developed countries. China is now a 
global superpower, particularly in terms of trade, and the EU is China’s largest trading partner. 
China is the EU’s second largest trading partner, after the United States, and demonstrates that in 
such a short period of time how influential China became economically.18 China also became an 
influential member in many international organizations that the EU is also a part of, either with 
the EU as an actor or through member state representation.  
 Although China has been an important global actor and the trade between the EU and 
China has been plentiful for years, the EU still has yet to solidify its strategy for communications 
with China. The European Union and China have been in the negotiation stage of an Investment 
Agreement since 2013. The EU has trade partnerships with many countries, and even if not fully 
 






elevated to an agreement, the EU is a lot further in the negotiation process with other countries 
than it is with China. The trade partnerships that the EU holds with other countries vary, 
including customs unions, association agreements, and partnership and cooperation agreements. 
The EU is hoping to create an investment agreement with China that would define trade 
regulations, transparency requirements, protection for investors, and consider the environmental 
impacts of foreign direct investment. The EU claims a commitment to creating these trade 
partnership and investment agreements with China, but due to China being seen as a heedless 
actor when it comes to fair trade in the eyes of the EU, it is hesitant to create a deal. 
One of the first measurable results that can be found as an outcome of China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative, is the EU’s increased fervor to work with China and define their rules of 
engagement. Almost immediately after China’s announcement of its plan to connect countries 
along the Silk Road Economic Belt at a speech in Kazakhstan in September of 2013 and in 
Indonesia in October of the same year,19 the EU moves forward with creating an Investment 
Agreement between China and the EU in late 2013. Although an investment agreement had been 
discussed the previous year at the 15th EU-China Summit, the negotiations were announced at the 
16th EU-China Summit in November of 2013, with first round talks taking place in January of 
2014.20 The most recent EU-China Summit was the 21st summit that took place in April of 2019. 
This Summit had an increased focused on cooperation between the EU and China and 
specifically addressed the BRI with the EU stating “the EU and China will continue to forge 
 
19 Xinhua. 2015. Chronology of China's Belt and Road Initiative. March 28. Accessed March 2020. 
http://english.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/04/20/content_281475092566326.htm. 
 
20 Winkler, Iuliu. 2019. EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (EU-China CAI). December 15. 





synergies between China's belt and road initiative and the EU's initiatives with a view to improve 
Europe-Asia connectivity.”21 
The position of the EU stresses the need for transparency in the negotiations and the need 
to address ambiguities in China’s law and regulations. As the years have progressed, the 
negotiations for the Investment Agreement have continued and in April of 2019, set the date for 
the conclusion of the agreement for 2020.22 As China’s investment and influence spread, the 
European Parliament’s aim of the agreement included more and more requirements, adding in a 
sustainable development chapter in December of 2015.  
 
Relationship Between China and the Member States of the European Union 
  The bilateral relationship between the EU and China is very different from the bilateral 
relationships China holds with some EU member states. All EU member states hold a deepening 
relationship with China as it increases its wealth and status on the global stage. China has 
displayed an increased interest in the European market and is especially keen on tapping into 
new markets, like the countries of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe.23 EU member states 
have increased their economic and political relations in order to attract trade and investment from 
China, even to a competitive extent. To this effect, China has had a turn in balance of power in 
 
21 European Council: Council of the European Union. 2019. EU-China summit, 9 April 2019. October 31. Accessed 
March 2020. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2019/04/09/. 
 
22 Winkler, Iuliu. 2019. EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (EU-China CAI). December 15. 
Accessed March 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-
policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-china-investment-agreement. 
 
23 Huotari, Mikko, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, John Seaman, and Alice Ekman. 2015. Mapping Europe-China Relations: 




these bilateral relationship between itself and EU member states. A report on Europe-China 
Relations explains that “Europe is encountering a much more proactive China on the diplomatic 
front and the contours of the relationship are increasingly designed in Beijing. Asymmetries in 
EU member states’ relations have turned increasingly to Beijing’s favour. European governments 
find their relative influence over Beijing waning. This is exacerbated by their lack of 
communication, cohesion and, consequently, their inability to formulate common policies.”24 
China has been able to use its diverse relationships between each member state to emphasize the 
individuality of each relationship.  
 Although the EU aims to create a united stance on China, “European national strategies 
towards China are dominated by the logic of economics.”25 China is seen as a source of growth 
and so many European nations are willing to lessen the prominence of the importance of political 
ideals on their relationships with China. For example, Germany who is often a leader in EU 
policy reformation may be putting the Germany economy above an EU united stance on China. 
In May of 2019, German Chancellor Angela Merkel opted to embark on a German only 
delegation to Beijing, rather than accept executives from non-German companies to join the 
delegation, to improve German-Chinese business ties.26 There are quite a few examples of 
member states skirting around EU attempts at a unified stance in order to bolster their own 
economies, particularly in relation to the Belt and Road Initiative and to the EU’s attempts to 
regulate foreign direct investment into Europe. Despite the EU’s best efforts, it remains divided 
 
24 Huotari, Mikko, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, John Seaman, and Alice Ekman. 2015. Mapping Europe-China Relations: 








when it comes to policy on China since the EU is not in control of each state’s foreign policy. 
The Commission utilizes its information outputs to shape the foreign policy frame of the EU as 
having a united stance on China, but this framing does not represent reality. While China may be 
using the division of the EU to its benefit when creating its strategy for Europe, it is not the cause 
of divided Europe.  
 Moreover, China is not only involved in Europe’s market, but also sees the region as a 
key player in its strategic initiatives and aims to expand on a multipolar global order. China 
maintains a ‘flexible foreign policy approach when dealing with Europe’ and utilizes the BRI to 
spread its influence into Europe as deep as it can go.27 In the past, China concentrated its 
European investment in Western European states including the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany. The sectors of Chinese investment are vast but concentrate in finance, infrastructure, 
engineering and energy. However, in recent years, and particularly after the announcement of the 
Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has shifted its investment focus into other European 
regions, with largescale investment in Greece and the Western Balkans especially.28 The focus 
on Central, Eastern, and Southern European Union member states may be a result of these 
regions being the most open to outside influence to spur their economies and China’s aim of 
geopolitical gains. The case studies presented in subsequent sections will demonstrate how 
national actors in the region of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe respond to China, and 
further how the EU responds to these projects.  
 
 
27 Huotari, Mikko, Miguel Otero-Iglesias, John Seaman, and Alice Ekman. 2015. Mapping Europe-China Relations: 
A Bottom-Up Approach. European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC). 
 
28 Barisitz, Stephan, and Alice Radzyner. 2017. "The New Silk Road, part II: implications for Europe." Focus on 
European Economic Integration (Q4/17): 70-81. 
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The Center for a New American Security’s Study on the BRI 
Since China’s Belt and Road Initiative has been at the forefront of China’s external 
relations, there have been a growing number of studies and research on the project. One study 
that will be used as the basis of understanding the BRI and the challenges it faces is the Center 
for a New American Security’s study conducted by Daniel Kliman, Rush Doshi, Kristine Lee, 
and Zack Cooper.29 Understanding these challenges that the BRI faces and the criticisms it 
receives is essential to understanding how changes in EU policy is affected by the Initiative. In 
order to judge if the EU is changing its policy to counteract the growing influence of the BRI, 
grasping the challenges of it will reveal potential points for the EU to emphasize ways in which 
it can do better.  
Kliman, et al. describes seven challenges that each BRI investment project may face and 
based off of this creates a checklist for how to determine the success of the investment. 
Although, it is important to note that the measurement is not focused on the success of China, but 
whether or not the host country benefits from the project. China is experiencing economic and 
geo-political gains regardless of the host country’s outcome. The European Commission can use 
to its advantage a more positive result-orientated approach and contrast itself to China’s focus on 
spread of influence.  
The first challenge presented by the study that is found in many infrastructure projects is 
the erosion of national sovereignty. China often takes control of the asset, due to financial 
backing, and the host country must accept the terms of the Chinese instructions. The country can 
become indebted to the Chinese for the project for many years to come. The lack of transparency 
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is the second challenge described in Kliman, et al.’s evaluation30. This is the idea that host 
countries will run into disadvantages when the contract proceedings are kept private and cannot 
be publicly scrutinized. The challenges exist at the national-level and ones that parallel 
challenges the EU often faces, especially in member states in Central, Eastern, and Southern 
Europe. The concern of sovereignty for EU member states is always at the forefront of EU policy 
discussion. The lack of transparency can also be related to the ‘democracy deficit’ that stems 
from the perceived lack of elected officials to drive the EU. If the EU can present solutions to 
these challenges, in its own foreign investment and in accepting outside investment, it may have 
the ability to deflate the BRI’s allure. 
Kliman, et al. assert that the indebtedness the host country may experience stems from 
the third challenge: unsustainable financial burdens. The project may cost far more than the 
revenue will ever expect to generate, leaving the countries paying back China for years to come. 
Another economic challenge posed, as described by Kliman, et al. is the disengagement from 
local economic needs. This relates to the fact that in these investment projects, the Chinese 
import their own firms and labor which does not allow the host country to benefit as deeply. The 
economic advantage to the host country is dependent on the cost of the project and the 
contribution China makes through a loan, with little to no new jobs created and no knowledge 
diffusion, it is hard to see the advantage of a project. The EU can counteract this challenge by 
ensuring that any investment it may provide in a third country will create jobs and knowledge, 
without leaving the country in an insurmountable debt.  
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The fifth, sixth, and seventh challenges are political in nature; the fifth considers the 
geopolitical risks of accepting the infrastructure investments from China. Other countries may 
not be willing to conduct business with the host country afterwards if they are rivals with China. 
Negative environmental impacts are defined by the sixth challenge and can be seen throughout 
infrastructure development, but it is especially true with Chinese investment. China is known to 
be particularly unconcerned with the dangerous environmental damage caused by the projects, 
especially as it is conducted outside of China. The last challenge presented by Kliman, et al.31 is 
the significant potential for corruption, particularly for countries that already have high levels of 
corruption in their governments. This, too, is a preexisting problem in Central, Eastern, and 
Southern European member states which is only exacerbated by BRI projects in the country. 
These investment projects only add to the payoffs received by politicians and bureaucrats. These 
challenges may be understood by the EU and then in turn used to demonstrate the benefits of 
interacting with the EU instead of China. The EU may argue that there would be far fewer 
geopolitical risks as the EU is generally well-regarded on the international stage. The EU also 
has significant measures in place to counteract climate change and is deeply concerned with the 
environment. Additionally, the European Union has procedures in place that aim to counter 
corruption and can accentuate this when proposing investment from within the EU as compared 
with China.  
These challenges are a guiding point in how the challenges presented by the BRI 
investment projects and how the EU may use these challenges to promote itself as an alternative 
option to China. Despite these challenges found in BRI projects, China is still gaining massive 
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economic and geopolitical influence as the projects continue to develop and spread to more 
countries. To counter this, the EU is focused on justifying their own means of investment and aid 
to show that they can do so without posing these challenges upon the host country. The EU has 
also understood these challenges in the investment projects the BRI has led to in member states 
and has sought solutions to stop investments that pose these challenges, which will be discussed 
in the case studies of Greece and Hungary and more broadly in Chapter 3.  
 
Case Study of Greece: Port of Piraeus 
 One of the most notable of China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects in Europe is its 
purchase of the Port of Piraeus in Greece. This port city is located just next to Athens and is 
strategically placed to support trade relations with the Middle East and Africa. In 2016, the 
China COSCO Shipping Group, a state-owned ocean shipping business, secured the majority 
stake of the Piraeus Port Authority with further plans to increase its stake after 2021.32 This 
involvement in the port is an important part of the BRI’s presence in Greece and the 
Mediterranean at large. The port is referred to as the ‘Gateway to Europe’ as access to it has 
decreased the duration for transporting goods from China to Europe and allows China easier 
entry into European markets.33 Prior to China’s management of Piraeus, the port was not 
reaching its full potential and was deemed ‘underdeveloped.’ However, after China stepped in, 
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the port has overtaken Valencia, and is projected to become the largest container port in the 
Mediterranean.34 
 The economic success of the port is hard to question, but for whom the growth is 
benefitting is not as clear. Greece faces many of the challenges that the CNAS study illustrates 
can often arise with BRI investment projects. Not only does much of the manufacturing and 
construction material for the port’s development come from China35, limiting the economic 
impact on Greek companies who could have benefitted, but moreover, critics of the acquisition 
say that workers’ pay is low and their rights restricted under the control of COSCO. One port 
worker said in an interview with NPR, “This is exploitation…We assume that COSCO wants to 
make very fast profits. So they will try to squeeze their expenses, and the incomes of workers are 
considered expenses. For us, these 'expenses' are our income to support our families.”36 Another 
worker echoed the aversion to the COSCO acquisition and told of how attempts at unionizing led 
to workers being fired. There is new equipment and new life in the Port of Piraeus, but under 
who’s control? Greece is attempting to protect its workers, but it also is focused on maintaining a 
good relationship with the Chinese. Another distressed interviewee from Kakissis’ NPR article 
quotes, “When the Chinese say win-win, they mean they win twice."37 The Greek state is put in a 
difficult position of wanting to show appreciation for the investment into the port and 
maintaining support for China but would also like to help their workers. This gives China the 
 










advantage in the situation and makes clear the cause for distress from port workers, Greece, and 
the EU as well. 
The geopolitical gains of China through the COSCO port purchase are of deepening 
concern to the European Union. Critics see Greece as being ‘too friendly to China’ as it allowed 
Chinese naval vessels to dock at Piraeus much to the dismay of NATO.38 Greece is also 
impeding EU criticism of China in order to pursue its own interests. In 2017, shortly after the 
port purchase, Greece blocked a resolution the EU had drafted condemning China’s restrictions 
on human rights activists that was intended to be presented at the United Nations. The EU had, in 
the past, presented a united stance on this issue, but Greece changed that with the explanation 
that it was an ‘unconstructive criticism of China.’39 The Commission must address this issue as 
China is detracting from the ideals that drive the EU by getting member states that want to focus 
on their relationship with China to stray. Greece’s actions to ignore China’s human rights 
violations detracts from the overall message of the EU values. The frame set forth by the 
Commission that designates the EU as value-driven is impugned by the lack of unity in 
responding to contradictions to its values. The decision by member states to pay higher regard to 
their own economic interests than to the norms and values of the EU also challenge the suggested 
EU foreign policy frame as it questions how the European Union can be truly value-driven if in 
reality, member states act in their own best interests. 
 In disregard to the Commission’s advising on how member states should respond to 
problematic behavior, Greece may be backing China on international actions it would otherwise 
condemn in the efforts of maintaining a good relationship. However, Greece, and other countries 
 





hosting BRI projects, have been accused of a loss of sovereignty. As the CNAS study describes, 
host countries often experience this problem as they are so much under the influence of China 
through its heavy investment that they give up some of their own decision-making power in 
order to maintain the relationship. These host countries are indebted to China either formally 
through monetary measures or inadvertently through geopolitical means. EU member states are 
exceedingly concerned for their sovereignty when it relates to EU policy, but when they accept 
such deep-rooted investment from China, it questions if their beloved sovereignty remains intact. 
This also plays into the idea that China is dividing Europe. As more countries receive investment 
from China’s BRI project and in the interest of bettering their relations with the Asian power in 
general, the member states of the EU are choosing to put their own interests above that of the 
Union. Even if they are afraid to give up sovereignty in the aims of a more powerful European 
Union actor, they will do so if they find it makes their own global influence stronger.  
 
Case Study of Hungary: Budapest-Belgrade Rail 
 China has become increasingly involved in the region of Eastern Europe and the Balkans 
with its 16+1 dialogue. This includes 11 EU member states and 5 outside the Union with the +1 
representing China. This forum has been criticized by Western Europe and has brought up the 
concern that the 16+1 is part of China’s strategy to divide Europe.40 The forum is often used to 
discuss China’s infrastructure investment into the region, but also includes discussion on 
agriculture, health, tourism, and education. China has targeted this area for the forum because of 
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the shared need in the region for investment and development. While the EU does offer its 
member states significant funding possibilities and there are EU sources and international 
organizations that can be used by the non-EU member states of the region, there is still a large 
financing gap which China aims to fill.41 This region connects the Eurasian region to more 
countries of Europe and is strategic for trade routes. The reasoning behind the interest from 
China is clear and the interest in involvement from the ‘16’ can be explained by Huotari, et al.: 
“Compared with the relatively slow process of project preparation and other institutional 
obstacles that must be overcome when applying for EU funding, Chinese investments appear to 
be a competitive alternative, as they come with streamlined approval processes, state-backed 
financing and rapid implementation.”42 Hungary is one of the members of the 16+1 dialogue and 
is on the receiving end of one of the biggest infrastructure projects in the region.  
 The Belt and Road Investment project for the Budapest-Belgrade railway is complex and 
involves many ideologically distinct actors. As this venture is an infrastructure project that 
connects two countries, each of those actors must be involved, with only one of the connecting 
countries being a member of the EU. The rail connection will decrease the travel time between 
Budapest, Hungary and Belgrade, Serbia from 8 hours to 2.4 hours, with future plans to extend 
the route even further through to Greece.43 This project is very attractive for China as this 
development will lead to more connections between Eurasia and Europe, but it will also expand 
China’s trade reach within Europe itself. Being more involved in these countries will grant China 
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greater access to trade on the Danube River, which is the second largest river in Europe starting 
from the Black Sea and running through 10 countries as far reaching as Germany.  
 Although at a high cost to Hungary and mostly financed through Chinese loans, Hungary 
would undeniably benefit from the decreased transit time between Budapest and Belgrade and 
the increased investment in the region would open its trade endeavors as well. However, there 
are many criticisms concerning how efficient this train line will make trade as there is still not 
enough infrastructure apart from this railway to make greater distance trading any easier. Viktor 
Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, pushed the project forward regardless because of his 
belief that Hungary must improve their relationship with China, especially since his nation has a 
lot of tensions with the EU.44 Since the expanded relations that led to greater Hungarian trade 
sales to China, the two countries have signed a memorandum of understanding on the BRI in 
2015 and established a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2017.45 Although this project still 
has years to be able to verify its success, it has been a pathway for Chinese-Hungarian relations 
to blossom.  
 As Orbán stated “if the EU cannot provide financial support, we will turn to China”46 it 
shows that Hungary acknowledges the need to create better ties with China stemming from sour 
ties between Hungary and the EU. Naturally, the EU had many concerns with this railway 
investment from China. The Budapest-Belgrade railway project undermines the EU’s internal 
market rules and the Commission expressed its concern about accepting trade and investment 
 
44 Prager, Alicia. 2019. Budapest-Belgrade railway: Orban flirts with China. September 23. 
 
45 Leandro, Francisco Jose. 2018. "Combining the "Belt" with the Roads at the Heart of Europe: Geopolitics of the 
BBSP Corridor." Megatrend revija/Megatrend Review 15 (3): 207-224. 
 
46 HVG. 2018. ‘Orbán: Ha az EU nem ad pénzt, Kínától kérünk’ [Orbán: if the EU does not give us money, we will 




without consulting the EU first.47 The EU began an investigation into the project to determine if 
it had violated EU law stating that large transport projects must receive a public tender to which, 
Hungary responded by calling for a public tender so the EU would drop the investigation.48 Like 
the effect of China’s purchase of the Port of Piraeus, this yearning for improved relations with 
China has Hungary protecting it from EU scrutiny in international organizations. Both Hungary 
and Greece have blocked EU statements on China’s parlous rights record and on its role in the 
disputed South China Sea.49 These actions call into question the EU’s loss of influence on the 
member states focused on remaining on China’s good side due to economic ties. The EU has lost 
much of its influence in Hungary for other reasons, but this project may show that China is 
inserting itself to fill that void, much to the distress of the EU.   
 Hungary’s decision to undertake the BRI investment project with China only calls more 
attention to the animosity between Hungary and the EU. Notorious for its shift towards 
populism, Hungary, led by Orbán is straying from the existing EU values of rule of law and 
liberal democracy. Hungary is leading the governments of other member states to follow suit, 
most notably in Poland, but also arguably in Czechia, Austria, and even Greece.50 Hungary is 
playing an important role in the ideological divisions within the EU and may be seen as one of 
the key actors in questioning the values of the European Union. The European Commission is 
attempting to create a frame for EU foreign policy that puts its values at the forefront, but when 
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the EU’s own member states do not subscribe to these values the entire frame is hard to believe. 
With Hungary in the lead, and many other member states undergoing democratic backsliding, 
there are concerns that the EU may become a ‘non-compliance community’ where even if it may 
frame itself in terms of its values, they are not followed in practice.51 Furthering this idea is 
Agnes Batory’s study that investigates EU member states and their compliance to EU norms 
which argues that member states only conform to norms in a symbolic or creative nature that still 
allows them to succeed in their original objectives. This article aims to prove that these member 
states often find ways of satisfying the Commission to where it does not have to lose its 
credibility if it allows the member state to proceed in their non-compliant actions, and even 
argues that enforcement may indeed only be symbolic as well.52 Another scholar, Martijn Mos, 
goes so far as to argue that EU values are ambiguous and thus cannot be enforced. He uses 
Viktor Orbán as an example to show that European leaders can utilize the absence of specified 
behavioral prescription with respect to EU fundamental values to argue that the leaders’ actions 
are indeed aligned with EU values.53 Redefining the values of the European Union must 
undoubtedly redefine the frame, if it is a frame focused on values.  
 Orbán has proven his lack of concern with conforming to EU values in many ways, but 
here in his acceptance of Chinese investment despite it being in the best interest of the EU. China 
is using this investment project to gain a foothold in the Central and Eastern European region, 
which detracts from the EU’s influence there. The region includes many of the member states 
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that are accused of defecting from traditional EU values and that are looking to grow outside of 
the Union. These states are turning to China to do and even vying for its attention within the 
region. Polish officials took part in the competitive aspect of garnering China’s investment by 
scrutinizing the Chinese venture into a technology park near Minsk, Belarus.54 This competition, 
too, leads to the understanding that China is dividing the European Union but can again be 









CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter will be largely divided into two sections that are focused on the evolution of 
the understanding of the EU narrative and the evolution of frame analysis as a method of study. 
Both of these sections will aid in the understanding of how the European Union, often through 
the Commission, conducts its foreign policy. One of the driving research questions of this thesis 
is concerned with the narrative of the European Union. Many scholars have concerned 
themselves with defining who or what the European Union is as an actor and how it exerts power 
on the global stage. Even prior to the European Union as an entity, scholars were interested in 
examining how the European Coal and Steel Community functioned in foreign policy as a 
coalescence of multiple nations. The works of some of the most significant contributors to this 
discussion of EU narrative and power structure will be discussed.  
Ian Manners is one of the most cited scholars when referring to the current understanding 
of the EU narrative. Normative power Europe is a concept that defines the EU’s ability to shape 
the conception of normal by its unwavering commitment to its values. This conception has 
evolved over time as the EU has aged and more scholars have contributed to the idea. However, 
many have also criticized this explanation for the EU power narrative and highlighted instances 
where the EU acts in ways that are in opposition to how a normative actor would behave. 
Manners himself has published works stating that there are times when the EU strays from the 
normative narrative. This section will describe some of the narratives prescribed to the EU that 
offer other solutions to the problem of defining the EU’s power. This will include the concept of 
civilian power Europe by Francois Duchene, the military power Europe suggested by Hedley 
Bull that never quite came to fruition, and Chad Damro’s idea of a market power Europe. Then, 
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the idea of Europe’s power narrative will be considered through the realist lens of Adrian Hyde-
Price to suggest that the EU narrative is in fact a realist one that explains why the Union may act 
as a normative power in some situations but not in others.  
The other section of this literature review will focus on the evolution of Erving 
Goffman’s frame analysis. This method for identifying an actor’s means for understanding 
information has been prescribed to many different fields. From Goffman’s original use of the 
method to interpret information, frame analysis has also been expanding through the work of 
scholars from much smaller actors, like a single individual, to actors with greater influence, like 
a nation-state or the European Union. One such instance of this is when Carla Santos uses the 
original frame analysis as a method in her research but applies it to a larger actor. Through time, 
more developments have been made to this simple method and Robert M. Entman goes on to 
show that when recognizing the construction of a frame what an actor chooses not to include 
may be just as important as what information the actor selects as important. Alex Mintz and 
Steven B. Redd apply this method to the field of political science and their research into political 
actors will be used here as an example for the frame analysis conducted in this thesis. The 
development of frame analysis, as well as the background of the EU’s narrative, will provide 
more insight throughout the analysis chapter of the thesis. These foundations are crucial to the 
current understanding of the EU narrative and frame, as crafted by the Commission. It is 
important to note that scholars often refer to the European Union as the actor when many times 





The Changing Narrative of the European Union 
 The European Union is a relatively new entity and very unique in its composition, 
making it hard to comprehend. There have been countless and ongoing attempts to define what 
the European Union is as an organization or governing structure, how it behaves as an actor on 
the world stage, and what the effects of its influence are. The literature of Ian Manners is 
frequently cited when discussing these questions. At present, a great part of the understanding of 
the European Union as an actor is based on Manners’ theory of ‘normative power Europe’ 
(NPE). In his article that coined the phrase, Manners55 describes the history of the European 
Union and its course of being thought of as a civilian power to a never-implemented, military 
power to the normative power it is often recognized as today. Manners describes Francois 
Duchene’s idea of the civilian power structure and its application to the European Coal and Steel 
Community. Duchene claimed that the EU’s power came from its economic power and not 
through its military, since it did not have one. This lack of force capability but still having the 
ability to influence others is what Duchene’s idea of civilian power describes. Manners does 
state that this power characterization may have been valid at the time, but the EU has since 
evolved, and the understanding of its power narrative must evolve with it.  
The next evolution came when the narrative of a civilian power Europe lost its 
attractiveness in light of the Second Cold War of the late 1970s and 1980s and the idea of Europe 
acting as a realist power became more prevalent.56 This understanding of Europe as a military 
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power was strengthened after the signing of the Treaty on European Union in 1992 in Maastricht 
and with the agreement to a common European security and defense policy in 1999. These 
actions implied that the EU was headed toward a greater military power with a greater focus on 
its security and defense. However, a joint European military power has never come to be a 
threatening force and this theory of military power being the defining narrative for the EU 
receded.57 
 As military power Europe never came to the fruition many scholars believed it would, 
this opened the door for Manners’ normative power narrative to establish itself and take hold. 
Manners argues that “by refocusing away from debate over either civilian or military power, it is 
possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing 
normative power”.58 He contends that this is the better conception of the analysis of the EU 
because other narratives analyze the EU in a way that a state would be analyzed and do not 
account for the intricacies of the supranational/intergovernmental structure of the European 
Union. The ideational nature and commitment to a set of norms is what gives the EU “its ability 
to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” and defines its normative power 
narrative.59 
 Manners may have been the first to apply the normative power narrative to the EU, but as 
he mentions, he was not the inventor of the concept of normative power. Manners refers to E.H. 
Carr and Bertrand Russell, who distinguished between economic power, military power, and 
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power over opinion and explains that the idea of power over opinion is the predecessor to 
normative power. Manners then goes on to cite Johan Galtung who published a review of the 
European Community (EC) and its upcoming superpower status at the time, while comparing the 
EC to the United States. Galtung described the EC as having the power to influence through its 
norms or ideas. Manners explained his understanding of Galtung’s argument and asserted that 
when Galtung said in his 1973 work that, ‘ideological power is the power of ideas,’ he believes 
that Galtung is arguing that “ideological power is ‘powerful because the power-sender’s ideas 
penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient.’”60 Manners believes the European Union to 
be the power-sender in the international community in this understanding of Galtung’s 
ideological power and describes in another way how the EU influences the actors it interacts 
with. 
 In order to clarify what norms the EU is radiating onto the world stage, Manners goes on 
further to explain what the ‘core norms’ of the European Union are: peace, liberty, democracy, 
rule of law, and respect for human rights.61 These values can be found throughout foundational 
EU documents, particularly in the Treaty on European Union, and are found in the self-branding 
of the European Union today. On the Europa website, in the About Us section, the EU lists its 
values: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and human rights.62 Manners 
 
 
60 Manners, Ian. 2000. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute. p. 29.  
 
61 Manners, Ian. 2002. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" Journal of Common Market Studies 
40 (2): 235-258. 
 




claims that as a normative power these values or norms are the driving force of EU interactions 
in its actions on the international scene and influence others to follow the same values.  
The normative power narrative has evolved over time as more scholars have undertaken 
the idea to describe the institution that is described as both supranational and intergovernmental. 
The argument for normative power narrative is that the EU defines itself through its norms and 
through these norms, sets a precedent for states around the world to follow. However, the way in 
which the European Union influences the universal norms is changing, and thus, the 
understanding of normative power Europe must evolve as well.  
 Manners sparked much criticism and debate after publishing his idea that the EU should 
be analyzed in this normative power conception. In further publications that respond to the 
discussion surrounding the NPE, Manners and others argue the importance of understanding that 
there are situations in which the EU does not act as a normative power actor would, but 
continues to be a normative power actor, nonetheless. This recognition enforces the idea that 
there should be a distinction between normative power Europe in theory and normative power 
Europe in empirical purposes. The NPE ‘is a theoretical grounding that guides analytical work 
attempting to make sense of and explain the role of the EU as a global actor’.63 This argument 
aims to clarify why the EU may not always act in a normative way, as critics have pointed out. 
 Manners also responded to the criticisms in an article published in 2013 with a direct 
reference to the effect of the global era on the definition of the normative power Europe 
framework. The article presents the idea, that in the case of interaction between Europe and the 
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wider global community, one must consider two meanings of ‘normative power’. Manners 
explains that as argued by Raymond Aron, puissance is defined as the potential to do something 
while pouvoir is the actual act.64 Manners furthers this interpretation to explain that pouvoir is a 
normative form of power and is different from puissance, which is the normative ideal type of 
actor.65 This creates the distinction between the EU’s ability to exert its normative power 
influence, with the reality of the EU executing it.  
 Another author that questioned the EU’s normative power narrative due to global factors 
was Bettina Ahrens. This author questions whether the European Union can still be a normative 
power and exert international influence when it is dealing with crises at home. A key question in 
this article is regarding the cohesive response of the EU member states in dealing with 
international occurrences. Although this article argues that ‘ambiguity’ that results from foreign 
policy response to international situations should not impede on the EU’s normative narrative66, 
the exceptions made to align the EU as a normative power are being stretched quite thin.  
 Manners and other scholars have adjusted their definition and understanding of the 
normative power narrative as the European Union seems to stray from its norm-driven agenda, as 
a possible result of the EU’s interactions on the global stage. The European Union is becoming a 
major player in international affairs and has exuded a lot of influence since it has grown its 
economy and its population. The EU has relations with countries on a bilateral basis that extend 
and may work differently than the relationships between third countries and the countries that 
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make up the European Union. With these greater outward flows of power, the EU as a normative 
power has been questioned, and the scholarly literature on the narrative has paralleled these 
concerns where even the coiner of the phrase normative power Europe, Manners67 has proposed 
that the EU may not always act as a normative power.  
With a growing discussion of the Union acting in ways contrary to how a normative 
power would act, there have been new claims of how to better define the narrative of the 
European Union. Chad Damro introduced the idea of Market Power Europe in 2012, as he 
believes since the single market is at the core of the European Union, the description of EU 
power should reflect that. Damro does reiterate the importance of the EU’s influence on 
international affairs, but claims this to be more of a result, intentionally or not, of its economic 
driven policies rather than at the forefront of the EU agenda.68 This understanding of the 
European Union basing its decisions and international strategies on its economy and market may 
have credence when considering its role on the world stage. The EU is itself not a state actor and 
thus will have different goals for how to increase its status and power. This may be to promote 
the economies of its member states to in turn increase the economic power of the EU as a whole. 
This does not mean to discredit the idea of a normative power Europe, but instead offer an idea 
for how the Union has adjusted to the changing global order.  
The shift from a normative focused Europe to a market focused Europe can be explained 
through the paradigm of realist theory. Realism’s main conception is that actors operate in the 
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pursuit of power, and in this case, the EU is no different. The European Union, through its 
different bodies, operates under various narratives in various situations that would grant it the 
most amount of power for that situation. There are some situations where the EU may act as a 
normative power when utilizing its soft power and showcasing its value driven decisions. There 
are other situations when the EU may put the interests of its market ahead of the values it claims 
when this would be the greatest power play. The current global order has the normative narrative 
under pressure and changes within the EU explain the shift in narrative. The changes to the 
environment that are affecting the EU narrative are described by Hanna Tuominen as 
“Traditional power politics and state sovereignty are on the rise, rather than normative issues like 
human rights. The unipolar world, in which the US was standing as the sole superpower, is 
moving towards multipolarity with various centers of power.”69 As the European Union adjusts 
to these changes and drifts from its normative power, it opens the door for a new narrative to be 
introduced.  
Although scholarly analysis of the EU through a realist lens is rare, it is not novel. Adrian 
Hyde-Price used realism to critique the normative power Europe claim in 2006. He wanted to 
challenge the liberal and idealist notions of the EU and instead focus on how it acts in a 
neorealist manner. In his definition of neorealism, his first core assumption is that “international 
systems [are] anarchic – a domain without a sovereign. For this reason, it is also a self-help 
system: states must look to their own security and survival in what is a competitive realm.”70 
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Hyde-Price then goes on to examine how the EU adapted its international strategies to fit the 
occurrences going on in the world, from World War II to the Cold War to the US gaining 
superpower status. The European Union’s narrative is ever evolving, with the changes in 
international relations, and the EU must be considered a realist actor, especially in times of 
changing global order.  
The analysis of the European Union for the remainder of this thesis will consider the EU 
under a realist perspective. Each proposed narrative for the EU by the many scholars who have 
contributed to the conversation may be valid, which proves that the EU is actually a realist power 
that can change its behavior to adjust for its environment. The EU was a normative power in the 
past, and may still want to spread its influence through its values, but in this global order acts 
more in a realist manner than it does in a normative one.  
 
Frame Analysis: From Goffman to present 
 The European Commission creates a narrative for the EU through its words and actions in 
its international relations. This narrative has shifted in recent years as could be seen through a 
change in the language used in the foreign policy releases of the EU through the Commission 
and through the activities it pursues on the world stage. Erving Goffman launched the concept of 
frame analysis to understand the way that information is distributed and consumed.71 He defined 
frame analysis as “a slogan to refer to the examination in these terms of the organization of 
experience.”72 His method was meant to be utilized for understanding one-on-one, face-to-face 
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interactions and how a person’s individual point of view may change their interpretation of a 
situation. Culture is a key aspect to how one understands information, according to Goffman.73 
His idea for frame analysis was to be applied to sociology and used in ethnographic research, but 
the method has expanded to be used in other applications as well.  
Carla Santos interprets Goffman’s seminal work Frame Analysis as an account that puts 
forth the idea that frames are created by an individual to make sense of situations and organize 
information to create the individual’s reality. In her research, she applies the method to her field 
of recreation and tourism to analyze how American newspaper outlets are framing Portugal as a 
tourist destination.74 She analyzes the words and phrases used to describe the country and 
explains how these descriptors frame the American idea of Portugal as a travel destination. She 
also mentions how these newspapers will influence further newspapers to take on this frame for 
Portugal and impacts the entire understanding of the country. Her research showcases that 
Goffman’s original idea of a frame analysis that can be applied to a single actor, can also be 
applied to a larger entity, in the case of Santos’s research, the majority of American news media.  
Since 1974, frame analysis has gone on to be applied to many different fields to interpret 
the organization of information, including sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
communications, and international relations. Other scholars have developed the concept and 
Robert M. Entman changed the focus to both what is included and what is omitted in information 
distribution. His definition of framing is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
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them more salient in communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”75 Entman 
continues his explanation of framing by including the example of the ‘cold war’ frame that 
dominated the news of the United States for many years. This frame painted foreign events as 
problems related to communism in order to influence meaning making, the process through 
which people make sense of situations.76 The way that information is released has a great impact 
on the way that information is digested by the public.  
 In international relations, the frame analysis is focused on the frames which governments 
and leaders use to shape policy choices. Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd highlight different 
methods of framing that political leaders may employ to manipulate policy debate. This includes 
Entman’s idea of considering both what is said and what is not said by the actor. Mintz and 
Redd, in their study of political leaders, reference earlier work by Mintz and Nehemia Geva to 
describe thematic framing as a type of framing that is content based and introduces ‘organizing 
themes’ into the policy discourse, such as national security, economic, or political.77 This idea 
allows for a frame to be applied differently to different contexts, such as a political leader 
describing the importance of one social issue, for example the environment, differently in 
various situations. The concept of organizing themes help explain why the actor would apply 
different emphasis based on the context. A successfully instilled frame by a political leader 
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influences the popular attitudes of the audience and can set the direction of policy changes in 
favor of the leader.  
For this thesis, the concept of a frame analysis is being expanded even further to consider 
the foreign policy frame of the European Union. This actor encompasses a much bigger scope 
than a single political leader or a single industry. The European Union itself is hard to explain as 
a single actor, but to determine the frame it constructs through its different branches is even more 
difficult. This thesis will consider the European Commission, in partnership with the European 
External Action Service, to be the architect of the EU foreign policy frame. In order to determine 
the frame, the informational outputs of these two entities will be considered. The Commission 
releases policy reports and other publications to create an understanding of how the EU acts in 
international scenarios. The EEAS distributes press releases that are in harmony with the 
message of the Commission. These press releases often include statements from EU 
commissioners that relate to EU foreign policy. As these two bodies work in cooperation to set 
the message of EU foreign policy, they will be considered the key actors for understanding the 





CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
 
 This chapter will analyze the impact the BRI has had on the European Union and the 
changes it has inspired on the EU’s foreign policy frame and EU narrative. The first section will 
go into detail on the changes in the frame constructed by the Commission, paired with the EEAS. 
This will include an analysis into the different foci of the various Commissions that have been in 
place during the timeline of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Junker and Von der Leyen 
Commissions were in power during the announcement period of the Belt and Road Project and 
time afterward that allowed for analysis. The frame set forth by these Commissions will be 
contrasted to the Barroso Commission that preceded Junker’s and show how influential the 
shifting global order is on the foreign policy frame of the EU. These Commissions closely align 
with the messaging of the European External Action Service as one of the Vice Presidents of the 
Commission is the High Representative of the EEAS and their voice is the same on both 
platforms. 
 The following section will then analyze the internal changes to the European Union that 
resulted from the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative. This will focus on how the 
Commission attempts to create a more united EU through discourse and the policy changes that 
relate to the EU stance on China. The focus on unity is to prove to the world that the EU is still a 
powerful global actor even though China is on the rise. This section will also describe the policy 
changes that are in response to BRI investment projects taking place in the EU, like the Port of 
Piraeus and the Budapest-Belgrade railway.  
 Later in the chapter, the discussion shifts to how the EU’s relationship with China has 
changed as a result of the BRI. This focuses on how the European Union would like to be more 
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involved in the project, when it is beneficial for it to do so. The EU places greater emphasis on 
finalizing its cooperation agreement with China in light of the success of the Initiative. However, 
it also is concerned with negative implications that come from BRI investments in Europe and 
the policy changes that can counter these negative effects.  
 The last section of this chapter will describe the changes that the BRI has had on the 
relationship between the European Union and third-party actors. This includes the EU’s own 
investment projects and how they have been influenced to counteract China’s attraction. The EU 
has also taken measures to ensure China’s transparency in international organizations, such as 
calling for reforms in the World Trade Organization. This section is important to understanding 
not just the effects between China and the EU, but how it is relevant to the EU in a global 
context.  
 
The European Union’s Frame Change 
 The increased investment into Europe by China and the understanding that China is 
gaining geopolitical power in its investments in Europe and other continents has led to a shift in 
the frame that the Commission and EEAS have formed on the messaging about foreign policy, as 
seen from the informational output during the period of 2016 to 2020. This can be seen through 
the Commission’s and EEAS’s emphasis on certain phrases in its publications. With the current 
state of a changing global order, the EU is promoted as an economic and political actor that, 
while still driven by its values of democracy and rule of law, is also progressive and adaptable.  
A more progressive EU is exemplified through the Commission’s set priorities for 2019-
2024, which includes ‘A stronger Europe in the world’ as one of six of its key focuses for this 
45 
 
five-year period. Through this Commission priority a ‘more active and stronger EU voice’ is 
called for while acknowledging that “A strong, open and fair trade agenda, making Europe an 
attractive place for business, is key to strengthening the EU’s role as a global leader while 
ensuring the highest standards of climate, environmental and labour protection.”78 While this 
shows that the EU is still committed to its values, it also underlines the importance of making the 
European Union an attractive marketplace.  
The Von der Leyen Commission has more of an emphasis on international cooperation 
than past Commissions. The Junker Commission, from 2014-2019, began increasing the 
Commission focus outside of the European Union and included a small Project Team named ‘A 
Stronger Global Actor’. Junker’s time as Commission President was heavily influenced by the 
migration crisis in Europe and in response, wanted to ensure the European Union was still a 
powerful player in the global arena. Addressing the issue of migration and pursing an EU more 
equipped for the digital age were some of Junker’s priorities for his Commission.79 These 
priorities of the Junker Commission and the Von der Leyen Commission, are very much in 
contrast to the Barroso Commission which was in place from 2004-2014. This Commission had 
a much greater focus on the internal challenges of the EU and focused greatly on integration. The 
changes in Commission priorities show how the frame of the EU’s foreign policy can be set 
through the Commission.  
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The Commission would like to shape its audiences’ perception of the EU narrative 
through the prominence of particular words and phrases when it releases information related to 
investment, aid, trade, and the EU’s relations with China. Some of the terms that were noticeably 
common in Commission and EEAS documents relating to foreign policy were ‘rule of law,’ and 
‘democracy’ in addition to ‘transparency,’ and ‘sustainable development.’ These terms were 
found in policy changes and developments the European Commission enacted after the 
announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative and in European External Action Service press 
releases. An example of these phrases being used are in the European Commission’s 
International Cooperation and Development’s About us page which describes its goal to “reduce 
poverty, ensure sustainable development, and promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law across the world.”80  
Another example of the European Union’s increased focus on sustainable development in 
its foreign investment can be seen in the EEAS’s press release on the External Investment Plan 
which states, “The EIP aims to promote inclusive growth, job creation and sustainable 
development.”81 The EU’s devotion to transparency is projected through its showcase of its 
commitment in bilateral and regional negotiations and agreements found on the Commission’s 
‘Transparency in action’ webpage that states, “The variety and quantity of texts available on this 
website show the European Commission’s commitment to being the world’s most transparent 
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public institution in the field of trade policy.”82 In other words, the EU is highlighting the fact 
that it can be successful in a plethora of trade deals while still being transparent, a term often 
used to describe what China is not. These phrases are common in the current EU information 
output and help to create a frame for the EU’s foreign policy that shows it is a strong world 
leader, committed to its values and, in particular, the values that China is often criticized for 
lacking.   
 
Internal Changes as a Result of the BRI 
There are changes being made within the EU to combat China’s growth as well. The 
European Union attempts to address the criticisms it receives in order to improve its power and 
influence in the world. It is committed to increasing its democracy, as the democratic deficiency 
is often brought up as a concern of EU governance. China’s lack of democracy is often addressed 
in EU-China dialogue and the EU wants to show it is on the right side of this debate. Apart from 
that, the EU is also often confronted by its lack of the ‘single voice’ it so desperately desires. The 
Commission would like to present the EU’s strength and unity to the world to show that it too is 
a powerful actor on the global stage. The EU has specifically called for greater unity in its stance 
on and relationship with China. The EU member states are often acting in their own self-interest 
but the Commission would prefer to seem unified in its China response. Prior to the most recent 
EU-China Summit that took place in 2019, “ the Commission and the High Representative issued 
a joint communication stressing that neither the EU nor any of its member states can effectively 
 





achieve their aims with China without full unity”83 and that “In cooperating with China, all 
Member States, individually and within sub-regional cooperation frameworks, such as the 16+1 
format, have a responsibility to ensure consistency with EU law, rules and policies.”84 The EU is 
addressing what may be seen as its own shortcomings in order to prove that it is a world power 
that can be just as influential as China.  
In order to address the problem of unity regarding China even more, the EU updated its 
policies on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the European Union. The European 
Commission boasts it is, “the world’s main provider and the top global destination of foreign 
investment.”85 In November of 2015, the EU agreed upon a reformed investment dispute 
settlement approach that emphasized the need for legitimacy and transparency. This policy 
introduced the Investment Court System which would be able to protect investments through this 
mechanism. This system was put in place “to strike a balance between protecting investors in a 
transparent manner and safeguarding a state’s right to regulate to pursue public policy 
objectives.”86 This being the beginning of a period of heightened concentration on transparency 
in investment into the European economy.  
In the 2017 State of the Union, the European Commission proposed a new framework for 
screening FDI. President Jean-Claude Junker stated in his State of the Union address, “If a 
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foreign, state-owned, company wants to purchase a European harbour, part of our energy 
infrastructure or a defence technology firm, this should only happen in transparency, with 
scrutiny and debate. It is a political responsibility to know what is going on in our own backyard 
so that we can protect our collective security if needed.”87 This speech taking place shortly after 
the COSCO purchase of the Port of Piraeus, the ‘purchase of a European habour’ can be directly 
attributed to that situation. The Commission’s press release described the need for the proposed 
framework by again alluding to China’s investments into Europe with the statement:  
In some cases foreign investors might seek to acquire strategic assets that allow them to 
control or influence European firms whose activities are critical for our security and 
public order. This includes activities related to the operation or provision of critical 
technologies, infrastructure, inputs or sensitive information. Acquisitions by foreign 
state-owned or controlled companies in these strategic areas may allow third countries to 
use these assets not only to the detriment of the EU's technological edge, but also to put 
our security or public order at risk.88  
In 2019, a regulation was adopted that created a system for screening foreign direct 
investment and thus would lead to a more cohesive strategy for the EU member states to follow. 
The EU states that this regulation will “make sure that the EU is better equipped to protect its 
interests, while remaining among the world’s most open investment area.”89 Prior to the timeline 
of the BRI and the focus on unity and transparency, the regulation on investment adopted in 
2012 was to make sure that investment agreements were consistent with EU law. The simplicity 
 
87 European Commission. 2017. State of the Union 2017 - Trade Package: European Commission proposes 










of EU investments policy faded drastically with the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative 
into the European Union’s domain.   
Investment into the EU was not the only subject to receive a greater focus on 
transparency from the great leap in China’s influence. Trade negotiations also were expected to 
be made more transparent, according to the new Commission for 2019-2024.90 The call for more 
transparency and inclusivity in trade talks even included a reference to the ‘Transparency in 
action’ page that showcased all of the EU’s transparent successes. Another trade policy focus by 
the Commission lists ‘Harnessing globalisation in line with EU values’ and explains this as “The 
EU continues to ensure that trade and investment remain balanced and rules-based. This not only 
opens markets with our trade partners but also strengthens the EU's global influence on issues 
like human rights, working conditions and environmental protection.”91 This section also links to 
the Commission’s page on sustainable development and utilizes this to enforce the idea that the 
EU uses trade to spread its influence in positive ways, applying its normative narrative for its 
own self-interest. 
 
The BRI Affects the EU’s Relationship with China 
 Since the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative and before that, China has been a 
growing force on the global stage. The European Union has been keeping track of the rise of the 
Asian power but the BRI really set the urgency for solidifying the EU-China strategic partnership 
 








and Investment Agreement that each party committed to but have not finished negotiating. The 
EU addresses its need to form this relationship with the successful and continuing to rise China 
but is concerned about the corruption of its norms in order to do so. The EU addresses this in a 
document detailing EU-China Relations: 
In order to maintain our prosperity, values and social model over the long term, there are 
areas where the EU needs to adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen its 
policies. Based on clearly defined interests and principles, the EU should also seek to 
deepen effective and coherent engagement with China. Given the importance of EU-
China economic relations, it is important to maintain very close trade and investment 
links, while developing a more balanced economic relationship.92  
The drive for these investment negotiations to lead to an agreement is on the forefront of the 
EU’s mind. The Commission and the EEAS released countless material related to the 
developments in the EU-China relationship in recent years and have had a range of feelings 
toward China, in some cases calling the nation a ‘strategic partner’ and in others a ‘systemic 
rival’. 
 In cases where the Commission is trying to have more cooperation with China, it will see 
it as a partner, especially in areas where China is successful, and the EU would like to play a 
role. For instance, Olivia Gippner and Diarmuid Torney analyzed the shifting policy priorities of 
EU and China energy relations to find that as time passed, the EU shifted from framing messages 
on energy from the value of ‘environmental stewardship’ to a greater emphasis on ‘affordability’ 
and ‘availability’.93 This can be explained with the EU’s need for more energy and devaluing its 
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norms to fulfill the demand, as well as an increased motivation to work with China and adapt its 
own norms to benefit.  
 The need for a better relationship pairs with Europe’s want for more connectivity in Asia 
and beyond, which will be discussed in the next section. Moreover, this has enhanced the need to 
connect with China who already has laid the groundwork for connectivity with nearly every 
region of the world with its Belt and Road Initiative. There were many statements made by the 
Vice-President of the European Commission/High Representative of the EEAS that sought to 
connect with China in order to connect better with the world. Some highlights include, “The EU 
is ready to step up its engagement with Asian and other partners on a positive agenda for 
connectivity, based on realising mutual interests, reaching common objectives through adherence 
to international norms and standards,” “Our offer is clear and simple with no hidden agenda: we 
will mobilise our regulatory experience, technical expertise in corridor-based cross-border 
transport, and the EU's funding opportunities,” and “The EU believes in China and in the EU-
China partnership. We are therefore ready to work with China and other partners, in the spirit of 
openness and engagement, to build bridges for the prosperity of the EU, China and the world.”94 
This tells the story that the EU is hoping to work with China to increase connectivity, while 
ensuring that it will be transparent, and ends by stressing its commitment to the EU-China 
relationship. Basically, the EU is very concerned with maintaining a good relationship with 
China, so long as it follows international norms, so that it can increase European-Asian 
connectivity.  
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 There are times in the EU-China partnership that Europe expresses the need for a 
profitable cooperation, but in order to do so, asks China to conform to European norms. The EU 
states that “China’s publicly stated reform ambitions should translate into policies or actions 
commensurate with its role and responsibility”95 to ask China to do more than talk, but is a call 
for the nation to act. The EU-China human rights dialogue was established so that the EU can 
“work with China and its people to promote human rights and to foster the rule of law and civil 
society.”96 The EU believes in the power of international organizations, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and requests that China play a more active role in the organization and the 
two have established the EU-China working group on WTO reform in order for China to do so.97 
The reluctance the European Union holds in formalizing an investment agreement with China 
arises due to China’s differing norms and its reluctance to conform to the EU’s idea of good 
behavior.  
The EU sees China as an important actor, like itself, in a multipolar world that is 
‘experiencing profound and complex changes’ and in their partnership “the EU reaffirms its 
respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. China reaffirms its support to EU 
integration.”98 This statement raises questions on whether or not the EU truly respects China’s 
‘territorial integrity’ with its disdain for China’s treatment of the Tibetan region, Hong Kong, 
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and Taiwan. It also must ask if China truly supports EU integration or if it is indeed trying to 
undermine the EU in a strategy of dividing the European Union for its own gain.  
 There are many instances in which the EU overlooks China’s divergences from Western 
norms, often due to economic interests. This is particularly true when EU member states have the 
power to cooperate with China, as shown in the case of Greece and Hungary. Both of these 
member states blocked harsh EU statements regarding China’s ‘territorial integrity’ in the South 
China Sea. The EU may want to admonish or even sanction China but has been blocked due to 
the self-interest of a member state. In the energy example, the EU itself diverged from a focus on 
sustainability in the interest of accessibility, which granted China a pass on the EU’s judgement 
of environmental harm.  
 The EU understands that China plays different roles in the relationship between them and 
expresses this as “China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with 
whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to 
find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and 
a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.”99 When China is acting as a rival, 
the EU must play to its strength and ‘strengthen the Single Market’.100 There are times when an 
individual member state will see China as a rival, as in the case of Germany where the 
Federation of German Industries (BDI) released a policy paper that expressed growing 
frustrations with China’s market-distorting practices.101 There are times when more than just a 
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member state sees China as disruptive as the European Chamber of Commerce in China wrote 
“the BRI has failed to become the open, transparent, and international initiative that it often 
claims to be as bidding processes are opaque and China’s state-owned enterprises take the lead, 
and the bulk of the value, from BRI-related projects.”102  
In response to the growing impatience of China not adjusting its actions in regards to the 
Belt and Road Initiative, the EU may focus on further developing its own connectivity strategy 
with other regions along with an adjustment to the EU procurement framework. This may 
include a limit on the access of foreign entities into the EU procurement market if the countries 
do not comply with EU law.103 Brattberg and Le Corre do state that “the EU is developing a 
more realist view of international affairs and cultivating a more assertive role for Europe”104 but 
question if that will be enough to prevent China from dividing the EU.  
 
The BRI Effects on the EU and the Outside World 
 The European Union has adjusted its strategy in its external affairs in response to the 
growing influence of China through the Belt and Road Initiative. The EU has announced the goal 
of greater connectivity around the world with a particular focus between Europe and Asia. It has 
also made significant changes to its own investment into other countries and has put a greater 










sustainable development goals set by the United Nations summit in 2015.105 Emphasizing this 
objective is meant to contrast the EU’s investment from China’s investment as it tries to make its 
own investment more attractive. The EU also tries to counter Chinese influence by imposing 
greater regulation on Chinese investment through international organizations like the World 
Trade Organization. All of these strategies are meant to prove that the EU is just as viable, if not 
more so, as a global leader than China.  
In the European Commission Vice President’s speech at the 2nd Belt and Road Forum, he 
says the new ‘EU Strategy: Connecting Europe and Asia’ is “based on four of the EU's strengths: 
its internal market as the basis of for sustainable connectivity,; its experience of creating 
networks across borders,; its ability to build partnerships,; and a comprehensive financial 
framework for mobilising investment.”106 These four strengths are employed to show other 
countries that the EU is organized in its external relations and is ready to continue being a 
leading world power. The speech goes on to express that “this approach of sustainable 
connectivity is best served when countries adopt sound regulatory frameworks, create better 
business conditions, are fiscally responsible, and encourage open markets and transparent 
procurement procedures”107 which are things that China claims to push for, but has failed to act 
on.  
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As such, the European Union has taken measures to stimulate its own connectivity with 
Asia. In 2018, it committed 124 million Euro to promote sustainable development in Central 
Asia.108 A major focus of this program will be on promoting economic development through 
helping governments create regulatory frameworks that are more conducive for business and to 
increase the competitiveness of entrepreneurs to increase trade. There will also be focuses on 
energy and water security, peace and rule of law, environment and climate change, disaster and 
climate resilience, as well as education.109 The Commission meticulously describes how each 
focus will be implemented and the importance these have on sustainable development. As other 
regions develop and connectivity expands, the EU will be able to conduct more trade with these 
countries and both sides with benefit.  
In general, EU investment and aid has increased in the hopes of greater connectivity and 
countering the Chinese influence of the BRI. The number of projects, host countries, and 
financial commitments has rapidly grown after 2013, with a substantial spike in 2015.110 The 
European Union also proposed a new agenda for its development initiatives. Although the idea 
of policy coherence for development was included in the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of 
Lisbon, in 2017 the EU reaffirmed its commitment to it. The EU is undertaking a 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development that aims to eliminate poverty and adhere to global development 
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goals.111 These goals are quite similar to China’s Belt and Road Initiative proclaimed goals of 
benefitting developing countries through investment and trade. However, the EU stresses the fact 
that its policy encourages ‘sustainable development’ which the BRI project is criticized for 
lacking.112  
Greater connectivity is being pursued in regions other than Asia to exert EU influence 
through the European Union’s External Investment Plan (EIP). This plan includes a package of 
financial guarantee programs worth approximately 800 million Euros and is aimed to help 
leverage eight to nine billion Euros in public and private investment in Africa and the EU 
Neighborhood.113 This plan is especially aimed at migrants and people who have had to flee their 
homes, and High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini said that the plan “has 
already started to bring real benefits to the people in our partner countries.”114 This plan also has 
a significant focus on sustainable development and is meant to help those in need secure jobs 
even after dire circumstances.  
China’s rise in Africa is no doubt a big motivator for the EU’s increase in investment 
there. This project of China’s, which began before the Belt and Road Initiative, surprised the EU 
as it was unable to respond in a suitable amount of time to stall China’s influence. Eventually, 
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the Commission launched the EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation initiative, but this was 
relatively unsuccessful with no noteworthy project having been completed.115 As China’s 
geopolitical power continued to grow in Africa, the EU wanted to reassert its own influence in 
the region. This would no doubt be difficult due to Europe’s past history of colonialism. 
However, investment projects focused on sustainable development, dignity, and sovereignty 
seem to curb those connections.  
 Another change that can be considered a way that the EU is trying to make their 
investment scheme appear more attractive to third countries than China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative is with its increase in ‘cash aid’. In February of 2019, the EU released a publication 
that commits their humanitarian aid programs to focus more on cash aid, which was determined 
as a more efficient way to distribute aid to developing countries. This idea stems from the belief 
that developing countries know how aid can be best used and thus receiving it in cash, rather 
than it being distributed into certain projects by a outside entity, will be more beneficial.116 This 
also grants the host country more sovereignty in its development, which again, can be seen as in 
complete contrast to the BRI’s method of investment. Cash also allows for more dignified 
assistance to those receiving it as they have the flexibility in using it. This is also supposed to 
allow for the aid to reach beneficiaries more directly and leads to the maximum impact for those 
in need.117 The publication describes four countries in which an increase in cash aid was 
successful to the sustainable development of that country.  
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 With the increase in investment programs and how the EU invests, the EU is changing its 
own external action policies, but it is not stopping at reform within its own body. In 2018, the 
European Union proposed reforms to the World Trade Organization to overcome the deadlock 
on the appointments to the WTO Appellate Body. The Appellate Body is the dispute settlement 
system but has been at a standstill in recent years. The reforms propose timeframes to work out 
disputes and clarifying which issues should be taken to the Appellate Body, but frequently use 
the terms transparency and legitimacy, as is the norm of the EU when China is involved.118 The 
EU also submitted ideas to modernize the World Trade Organization in its commitment to 
international organizations. The EU believes that the WTO is imperative in regulating the 
world’s trade. The EU sees the threat to the effectiveness of the WTO as a risk for the EU and 
one that could affect the political order and sustainability of economic growth.119 The EU is no 
longer satisfied with only implementing its own reforms and policy changes to counteract 
China’s growing influence, the EU has expanded its need for reform outside of its own body.    
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 From the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative, the use of the phrases related to a 
need for transparency, sustainable development, and a rule of law have become increasingly 
prevalent in the EU vernacular, especially after the effects of China’s spreading influence could 
be seen. The policy changes examined are constantly using the same terms to present a united 
European Union throughout, even if the EU is not as united as those who act in its name would 
claim. The EU is fearful of the effect of China’s influence on BRI host countries, and with merit, 
as China is gaining traction rapidly through the Initiative. The reiteration of these terms is the 
EU’s attempt at framing itself as a strong global actor that can naturally help developing 
countries ascend the global ladder.  
This is especially important as China claims to have a better understanding of how 
developing countries work and offers them a different approach to development than the 
standard idea from the West. President Xi Jinping claimed that China’s development strategy 
was “blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization.”120 With a 
changing global order and developing countries being skeptical of European influence, the door 
is open for China to gain a foothold in other developing countries. The Commission recognizes 
its need to reassert itself in the outside world and is taking measures to do so both internally and 
externally.  
 The Belt and Road Initiative is causing the European Union to alter its policies, but is it 
doing so in a way that changes the conception of a normative power Europe. Manners’ idea of 
 





NPE is that the EU acts in terms of its ideals and not its material pursuits, but as it loses ground 
to China in the developing world, it has been changing its narrative drastically. As China gains in 
power and countries become influenced, either through indebtedness or appreciation, they are 
shifting their attention away from Europe. The EU can no longer simply perform actions that act 
in its ideals in order to influence non-member states, it must cater to the wants and needs of these 
third countries to exert its influence.  
 The EU has always been a realist power since it utilizes different power narratives to 
spread its influence. The normative power Europe idea has been prevalent and the EU does fit 
into this category, but under a larger idea that it is a realist power that can act in a normative 
manner to achieve its goals, but can also use its economic power or other means to succeed 
showing that it is not at its normative, but realist as most other international actors are. Manners 
is correct in his definition of the EU as a normative power, but only in certain situations, when it 
is beneficial for the EU to be, and Manners even addresses that the EU does not always act 
normatively. When considering the effect of the BRI on the narrative of the EU, it is clear that 
the EU is not strictly a normative power because of its realist-inspired actions.  
 In addition to utilizing other power narratives, in order to try and regain the influence, the 
EU has adjusted its investment policies to be more attractive to third policies. China offers an 
attractive investment plan with lots of development and very little red tape. Western investment 
usually comes with guidelines and restrictions on how to first apply, then obtain and manage the 
investment funds. However, with the EU aim of making its investment more attractive, it has 
committed itself to programs like more ‘cash aid’ and investment that leads to sustainable 
development to promote itself in its external affairs.  
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 The European Union has also drastically changed its relationship with China; this nation 
is now at the forefront of EU thought processes when considering any type of policy changes. 
The EU views China as both a partner and competitor in its external relations. It must be willing 
to work with China because of its outstanding success, but it must also prepare itself to counter 
China and its growing geopolitical power. This geopolitical influence is even encroaching on 
European Union member states. So not only must the EU be afraid of losing its influence in 
developing countries or host countries for investment, China can also be seen as wielding power 
in EU member states. Due to the BRI’s influence, China has successfully gained a ‘political 
foothold’ in influencing EU policies. “In June 2017, Greece blocked an EU statement at the UN 
Human Rights Council criticizing [China’s] human rights record, the first time the Union failed 
to make a joint statement at the UN’s top human rights body.”121 This is not the only instance of 
a member state that was on the receiving end of a BRI project protecting China on a multilateral 
platform. This lack of cohesiveness is a fear of the EU’s and why there is such strong pushback 
against China’s BRI and the concession that a normative power narrative may not work in the 
Commission’s favor in this situation.  
 In response to this ability for China to divide the countries of the European Union 
through its attractive economy and investment, the EU is trying to create a more united front. 
This is difficult as a colossal concern of member states is the loss of sovereignty that is 
associated with being a part of the EU. The EU would like to represent a clear and strong, united 
front on its relationship with China, but member states conduct their own foreign policy and 
these could be in contrast with one another. Interestingly, this fear of loss of sovereignty from 
 





being a part of the EU is leading member states to reorient their foreign policy towards a more 
friendly relationship with China, even if it means yielding to the wills of China and possibly 
losing their own sovereignty in some aspects. As exemplified with Greece’s block of the EU’s 
reprimands at the UN Human Rights Council, these member states are so concerned with 
maintaining a good relationship with China to ensure the economic benefits, that they are willing 
to disown shared EU values.  
 The concern of European unity is especially important during the changing global order 
but also with the rise of Euroscepticism and Brexit. The world is viewing a more divided 
European Union in many fronts and its stance on China is only exacerbated by its lack of 
coherence. The problem of coherence is not new to the Chinese influence and has been prevalent 
in the EU prior to the Belt and Road Initiative. The Initiative is just calling attention to the 
ideological divide that exists in the EU, especially on member states’ stances on China. These 
member states act in their own self-interest in their foreign policy relations and the Commission 
finds it difficult to present the EU as a united front on China.  
 There are many more avenues to explore the EU’s response to China’s gain in influence 
than this thesis had the opportunity to explore. An interesting facet of the EU-China relationship 
is the focus on environmental concerns. The EU has had a recent emphasis on the importance of 
environmental protection and countering climate change. As China is still considered a 
developing country it is given different parameters to regulate its carbon footprint, but as the EU 
considers China its rival, it is likely it would be encouraging international organizations to 
recategorize China so that it would not be able to enjoy the perks that come with being counted 
as a developing country. This direction would be an interesting one to consider research on the 
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development of the relationship between the EU and China as both are big producers of carbon 
emissions.  
 Another facet of the EU-China relationship that could be mined more deeply is the idea 
that China is having greater success with its Belt and Road Initiative than the EU because of 
Europe’s history with colonialism. China often promotes itself as a developing country and thus 
able to understand what is best for other developing countries to advance their growth. 
Investment host countries of the EU may be more reluctant to adhere to EU policies because of 
the fear of the EU imposing its values on these developing countries and detracting from their 
sovereignty as opposed to allowing their independence. China’s interest in Europe for its BRI 
would also seem to be plausibly in revenge for Europe’s colonization and hinderance to the 
development of China, through historical events such as the Opium Wars. More Eurosceptic 
member states that do not want to adhere to EU regulations for their funds, turn to China instead 
with and allow for major Chinese control on their industries and actions in foreign policy.  
 As there are many more paths this thesis could have explored, it is safe to say it is not all 
inclusive of the research between the European Union and China as it relates to the Belt and 
Road Initiative. The BRI was only announced seven years ago which is hardly enough time to 
allow for proper analysis of its effects on the global order. More time would allow for better 
comprehension of the changes to the global order that result from the BRI and how this affects 
EU foreign policy framing. Furthermore, this analysis only considered EU policy changes as 
shown through statements/publications put out by the Commission and European External 
Action Service. The list of material analyzed is not exhaustive and could have been better 
evaluated through the use of programming software that can extract commonly used phrases in 
press releases to more clearly identify the change in the foreign policy frame of the EU. 
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Additionally, there are other bodies of the EU that are affected by the EU-China relationship that 
may provide greater insight into the effects of the BRI.  
 As the Belt and Road Initiative is happening in current time, it is susceptible to the events 
of the world. The COVID-19 epidemic that originated in China may have tremendous effects on 
the geopolitics of China and its rise in power. It is hard to say if this pandemic will make 
countries fearful of interaction with China due to its initial response to the virus. However, other 
actors around the world also had questionable responses and thus may not keep the same 
influence they had in the global order either. It seems possible that developing countries may 
continue to look forward to China’s investment projects, regardless of its response to the virus, 
due to their need to respond to events like these in the future. As these events unfold, the change 
in China’s influence on the international stage will become easier to comprehend. 
 Even though the Belt and Road Initiative is happening in real time, from its success so far 
it is clear to see it is affecting the European Union with great impact. The EU is experiencing 
division from China’s investment and member states competing for its attention. The lack of 
cohesion and unity in the EU is even more prevalent through the effects of the BRI and may lead 
to even further reform than has already been described. It is hard to still classify the EU as a 
normative power when so many of its actions were pursued in the interest of its own security 
rather than in pursuit of its ideals. The European Union is on a path of disunity and China’s Belt 
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